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TARIFF CONCESSIONS IN THE KENNEDY ROUND AND THE STRUCTURE OF
PROTECTION IN WEST GERMANY: AN ECONOMETRIC ASSESSMENT*
I. Introduction
It is well documented that the structure of tariffs in
industrialized countries affords the greatest protection to
relatively (unskilled) labor-intensive branches of industry
(Constantopoulos3 197^3 and references therein). Since we
know from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that this implies an
improvement in the relative reward for services of labor, in
particular unskilled labor, the political motive for such a
tariff policy is obvious.
In recent years industrialized countries have loudly
proclaimed their dedication to the principles of free-trade
and their intent to counterbalance the disadvantageous trade
position of the less developed countries. While progress on
the latter objective has been modest (Murry, 1973)s great
gains have been achieved in lowering tariff barriers. The
most significant advances in this regard were effected in
the GfATT Kennedy Round (1963-67), which produced an average
35 percent reduction in tariff levels of non-agricultural
products3 by far and away exceeding any reductions negotiated
in previous GATT rounds. An interesting question in light
of industrialized countries practised, as well as proclaimed
dedication to trade liberalization is whether their tariff
policy continues to be designed with labor's short-run
interests in mind.
This paper reports research undertaken in the "Sonder-
forschungsbereich Mr. 36 3 Weltwirtschaft und inter-
nationale Wirtschaf tsbezieiiungen (Kiel/Hamburg)" s with
financial support provided by the Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft.-* 2
An interesting study addressed precisely to this question
has recently been carried out analyzing United States tariff
reductions negotiated in the Kennedy Round (Chen, 1974). The
purpose of the present paper is to examine the same question,
using a similar method for the case of West Germany. The
results of the West German case are particularly interesting
in the way that they compare to those found for the United
States. For this reason we re-introduce in some detail Cheh's
model and findings for the United States. It should also be
noted in the introduction that the present study owes its
existence to a recent, detailed study of the structure of
protection in West Germany from wnich the bulk of the data
analyzed here are drawn (Donges, et al., 1973).
II. The Labor Adjustment Cost Hypothesis
Cheh's study of tariff policy in the United States marks
a departure from earlier studies in that the analysis focused
on changes in tariffs rather than their levels. As Cheh
pointed out3 the structure of tariff levels at any one point
in time is the product of a whole host of interacting factors,
many of which are historical and perhaps no longer relevant
in reflecting the prevailing outlook of policy-makers. Since
the focus of Cheh's study (as well as the present one) was
not confined to the broad issues of whether the tariff struc-
ture protects labor or capitals but rather to analyze the
current (Kennedy Round) thinking of policy-makers, the
preferable dependent variable is inter-industry variation in
tariff level reductions.
Aside from its success, a unique aspect of the Kennedy
Round xvas the adoption of a "linear" (uniform percentage)
rule of tariff reduction, as opposed to the item-by-item— ~Z
negotiations of previous rounds. This agreement itself
suggests that the participating nations had abandoned the
status quo trade policy. However, as is frequently the case
with rules3 negotiating parties found ample excuse to evade
the rule and to make demands for exceptions far in excess of
the "bare minimum" stipulated in the agreement. In the case
of the United States,, over one quarter of the nearly two
thousand items considered were exempted from the linear reduc-
tion rule. It was these exceptions to the rule which provided
the basis for Cheh's examination of the nature of U.S. tariff
policy in the Kennedy Round. In the case of West Germany,
reductions in the nominal external (non-EEC) tariffs between
1964 and 1972 varied between industries (at the level of
aggregation analyzed here) with a standard deviation of 12
percentage points (see Appendix Table II), implying that the
EEC, likewise, took advantage of the exception clause of the
linear reduction rule.
The central hypothesis of Cheh's study is that " ...
inter-industry variation in U.S. percentage tariff reductions
in the Kennedy Round reflect a governmental policy of
minimizing labor adjustment problems consequent on tariff
cuts" (Cheh, p. 325). The hypothesis states, in other words,
that while subscribing to freer trade, the United States
policy was to maintain in so far as it could, the status quo
position of relatively labor-intensive industry. In testing
this hypothesis, the "dependent" variable preferred by Cheh
(for reasons discussed below) was the percentage reduction
in nominal tariff rates across industries, adjusted for
corresponding changes in non-tariff barriers between 1964-72.
The "independent" variables proposed to proxy the short-run
labor adjustment cost occasioned by tariff cuts (and hypo-
thesized relationship to the dependent variable) were:
(1) Total employment in an industry, reflecting an industry's
potential political leverage (negative)(2) Labor use (labor-output ratio)s reflecting the employment
sensitivity of an industry to a given decline in sales
(negative)
(3) Percent of workers classified as unskilled,, indicating
the mobility of workers in an industry (negative)
(4) The percent of old-workers (over 55 years of age), for
the-same reason as (3) (negative)
(5) Average annual growth of industry 1958-63, to reflect an
industry's strength prior to negotiations (positive)
(6) The initial tariff level3 accounting for the absolute
magnitude of a given cut (negative).
Employing multiple regression analysis Chen found that
" ... as much as 50 percent of inter-industry variation in
reductions in nominal tariff and non-tariff rates negotiated
by the United States at the Kennedy Round may be accounted
for by our variables that proxy labor adjustment costs"
(Chen, p. 335). Before looking more closely into Chen's
findings (presented in Appendix Table I) we shall present
the results of a similar experiment on West German data from
which some comparative conclusion may be drawn.
III. The Structure of Tariff Reductions in ••Jest Germany
It should be stressed from the outset that no pretention
is made to "explain" the motives of West German policy-makers
or to ascribe the statistical results presented below to
their conscious policy objectives. Indeed, it would be fool-
hardy to even attempt such an undertaking since decisions on
external tariffs including those negotiated in the Kennedy
Round are determined jointly by the EEC as prescribed under
the articles of the Rome Treaty. We feel it is of sufficient- 5 -
interest to ascertain whether observed changes in tariffs
are consistent with hypothesized motives of policy-makers3 be
the results the product of accident or design.
As was argued above, changes in protection levels should
provide a clearer indication of prevailing policy than levels
of protection which may reflect a host of historical factors.
Furthermore, Cheh has argued that changes in nominal tariff
rates are to be preferred to effective tariff rates in
addressing the question at hand since it is most likely that
it is the former that policy-makers and pressure groups have
in mind in defining their objectives. While accepting the
reasoning, we shall examine for comparative purposes both
nominal and effective rates. Two different measures of
change in protection between 1964-1972 available in the Kiel
study (Donges, et al.) are used as dependent variables:
(1) percentage reduction in nominal tariff rates (NT) vis-
a-vis non-EEC countries, 1964-72 iJTR 64-72 = (NT 64
- NT 72)/NT64
(2) percentage reduction in effective rates of total
protection (EP) vis-a-vis. non-EEC countriess 1964-70
EPR 64-70 = (EP64 - EP7O)/EP64.
The effective total protection variable is a composite
variable reflecting changes in effective tariffs and the
tariff equivalents of non-tariff trade measures, taxes and
subsidies. Comparative analysis of the two dependent
variables is of particular interest since it is quite
possible that policy-makers substitute alternative forms
of protection. Changes in the structure of nominal tariffs
might well, therefore3 be compensated for by counter-
vailing shifts in non-tariff protection measures. Unfor-
tunately dependent variable (2) was not available for 1972.- 6 -
Results with respect to the two variables will not be
comparable, therefores in so far as the structure of changes
in effective total protection between 1970-72 (for which we
lack information) differs from that in the previous period,
1964-70.
The set of independent variables used to proxy the short-
run labor adjustment cost hypothesis for the 'Vest German
experiment was similar to that used by Chen, and was composed
of the following (hypothesized relationship to the dependent
variable in parenthesis);
(1) industry employment (L) (negative)
(2) industry labor-output ratio (LU) (negative)
(3) index of human capital-intensity (HK) (positive)
(4) index of regional concentration of the industry (RC)
(negative)
(5) initial level of protection (.NT64 or EP64) (negative)
(6) average annual growth, 1958-64 (G) (positive).
This set of independent variables differs from Cheh's in that
the worker-age variable was excluded by reason of data avail-
ability , and an additional variable reflecting regional con-
centration of industry (RC) was included. The relationship
between the geographic concentration of an industry and the
magnitude of its adjustment problems resulting from a given
decline m employment is obvious.
Following Cheh.. multivariate regression was used to
test the hypothesis that inter-industry variation in tariff
For an in-depth analysis of this relationship in the case
of West Germany, see Dickea et al., 1976.- 7 -
reductions granted by the EEC in the Kennedy Round reflect a
policy of minimizing short-run labor adjustment costs. A
linear relationship was assumed between the dependent and
independent variables of the form:
NTR 64-72
a + b (L) + c (LU) + d (HK) + e (RC)
EPR 64-70 j + f
the error term (e) being assumed to have the necessary
properties. In testing the hypothesis for West Germany, a
step-wise regression procedure was useds entering each
variable from the set of independent variables in the order
of its explanatory power and terminating the procedure when
none of the remaining unentered variables add significantly
to the explanatory power of the equation. In addition to
regression coefficients and t--statistics, beta-weight
coefficients are presented for each entered variable,
allowing the evaluation of the contribution of each entered
independent variable to the total explained variation in the
dependent variable.
The results of the West German case study are presented
in Table I. Regressions (1) and (2) show the results of the
test of the labor adjustment cost hypothesis with respect to
changes in nominal tariffs and changes in effective total
protection. In terms of explanatory power the independent
variables perform about as well on West German data as they
do for U.S. (see Appendix Table I). However, with respect
to nominal tariff reductions the labor adjustment cost
hypothesis is clearly rejected. The central variable of
the hypothesiSj (L). intended to indicate the potential political
A 90 percent significance interval was arbitrarily taken
as the criterion.- 8 -
Table I
REGRESSION RESULTS
a - PROTECTION REDUCTIONS AND LEVELS




































































































Notes: a. Regression coefficients, beta-weight coefficients and t-statistics.
b. Computed by comparing an industry's actual wage bill with that which
would occur were labor paid the wage of unskilled labor (see Fels,
1971, Donges, et al. p. 100).
c. Coefficient of variation of industry employment shares in German
Federal States (Bundeslander).
d. Airplane and Shipbuilding industries were excluded from the sample
for effective protection regressions because of their special circum-
stances (see Donges, et al., p. 34).
e. In this regression G pertains to growth 1964-72.
f. In this regression G pertains to growth 1964-70.
Source: Donges, et al., and Krengel, selected issues.- 9
leverage of an industry3 and which proved to be the single
most important explanatory variable of U.S. inter-industry
variation, does not appear significant at all in the case of
West Germany. Moreover, this finding cannot be attributed
to collinearity with other "independent" variables, as is
evident in the matrix of simple correlation coefficients
presented in Table II. The only independent variables that
do enter significantly, (RC) and (NT64), exhibit signs just
the opposite to that predicted by the hypothesis. The
2
former result is inexplicable. The latter, however, suggests
that the EEC attempted in so far as it could to execute the
plan of tariff harmonization, or ecretement , which it
proposed early in the negotiations as an alternative to the
American initiated linear reduction rule (see Preeg, 1970).
Regarding changes in effective total protection
(regression 2), the hypothesis appears quite relevant. Two
key variables, (L) and (HK)5 proved statistically signifi-
cant with expected signs. It would appear that the leverage
of German pressure groups has had its primary impact on non-
tariff forms of protection, a result that is not at all
surprising given that tariff changes are negotiated not by
the Federal Republic alone, but jointly with SEC partners.
Furthermore, one observes that changes in protection levels
have intensified the structural bias giving greatest
protection to relatively unskilled labor-intensive
branches. At the same time, one observes that contrary to
Note: RCS the coefficient of variation of employment
shares in 3undeslander3 takes a value of zero when the
industry share is the same in all Lander.
p
RC is not a very reliable variable at this level of
industrial or geographic aggregation. Moreovers there
is evidence of collinearity with MR64 (see Table II).
Thanks to K. Schatz for pointing this out.Table II

























































































Source: See Table I.11
expectation the most highly protected industries have
encountered the greatest losses in protection. We must
therefore grant the labor adjustment cost hypothesis a some-
what qualified acceptance in explaining inter-industry
variation in effective total protection reductions.
Before drawing implications from the results, it is of
interest to determine whether trade liberalization has
altered the structure of protection in West Germany. In
order to shed some light on this question, the absolute
levels of tariffs and effective total protection before (1964)
and after (1972 and 1970) the Kennedy Round have been
regressed on the set of independent variables. Results are
reported in regressions (3) - (6) of Table I. Regressions
(3) and (4) confirm the findings of previous studies (Donges,
et alt-; Constantopoulos) that the structure of tariff protec-
tion in W. Germany favors labor-intensive industry.
Comparing the results of (3) and (4) reveals that despite
significant reduction in tariff levels3 the structure of
tariffs has remained unaltered. The results presented in
(5) and (6) reveal that total protection is5 likewise,
heaviest in labor-intensive branches. In addition one
observes that industries which grow the slowest and are
therefore presumably the weakest receive the most protection.
Comparison of regressions (5) and (6) suggests that this
pattern has not been disturbed by the average 26 percent
decline in protection levels between 1964 and 1970, but if
anything has been reinforced in the process of declining
protection.IV. Conclusions
John Chen has shown that inter-industry variation in U.S.
tariff concessions in the Kennedy Round, as well as changes in
total effective protection,, can be partially attributed to a
policy of minimizing labor adjustment costs consequent on
tariff cuts. We have found no evidence to support a similar
conclusion with regard to nominal tariff concessions granted
by the EEC as they pertain to the German Federal Republic. In
fact, we have found that nominal tariffs were reduced the
greatest in those industries enjoying the highest levels of
protection at the time of negotiations. At the same time,
however, we find evidence that reductions in effective total
protection have been tempered by consideration of short-run
labor adjustment problems. This finding supports Gerhard
Pels' (197^3 p. 3) contention that "During the Sixties, a
shift occurred in "West Germany's industrial policy from assis-
tance by trade barriers to assistance by domestic subsidies
and tax allowances". A similar shift in the form of protec-
tion in the United States is not evident from Cheh's analysis,
however. Nevertheless, the results with respect to both
countries support the conclusion that while subscribing to
freer trade, industrialized countries have continued to main-
tain a policy compatible primarily with the short-run
interests of labor.
In terms of international as well as domestic welfare,
however, the West German policy would appear more rational
than that of the United States. The principle conclusion
of recent developments in trade policy theory is that taxes
and subsidies are almost always preferable to tariffs as a
means of dealing with domestic distortions, be they real
or imagined on the part of policy-makers (Bhagwati, 1971,
Corden, 197^). Moreover, although it is generally impossible13
to judge t.he welfare Implications of second-best adjustmentsj
it has been shown that adjustments that reduce extreme distor
tions or that reduce all distortions uniformly., under given
conditions3 lead to an unambiguous improvement in welfare
(Lloyd, 197*0. In light of these theoretical propositions,,
the West German (EEC) policy would appear at least in some
respects to be moving in the right direction.Appendix Table I
PRINCIPLE RESULTS OF CHEH'S ANALYSIS OF U.S. TARIFF CONCESSIONS IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
Regression Results - Percentage Reduction in Protection on Labor



























































'Estimated coefficients, followed by standard errors and /-statistics.
"Coefficient significantly different from zero at 1 percent level.
'Coefficient significantly different from zero at 5 percent level.
"Industries #24 (Household furniture) and #44 (Farm machinery and
































































omitted because they were not subject to any -
Notes: (i) NNR1: Nominal tariff reduction
NNR2: NNR1 adjusted for non-tariff measures
ERRl: Effective tariff reduction
ERR2: ERRl adjusted for non-tariff measures
(ii) Independent variables as defined in Section II,
Source: Cheh, p. 334.References
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